tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4639421058590597640.post4272660565674960186..comments2023-04-13T02:45:50.515-07:00Comments on The Ends of Thought: Causal Theories of Action (II): The Limits of Explanation AbstractionsRoman Altshulerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06570099479055051251noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4639421058590597640.post-64708482059993070592008-01-13T11:34:00.000-08:002008-01-13T11:34:00.000-08:00Hi Boram,Thanks for commenting.You're right that i...Hi Boram,<BR/><BR/>Thanks for commenting.<BR/><BR/>You're right that if I were making the argument you lay out, it would be a horrible one. I am not making that argument. But you're right that I am not very clear on how the two parts of my post here are connected. So, there are two parts:<BR/><BR/>1. Following on from the previous post, I am arguing that MRSs can't be legitimately used as premises in arguments unless their existence can be definitely established. Particularly: both Mele and Searle take the existence of MRSs as somehow self-evident, and I have a gripe with this. So my anti-introspection argument is part of the strategy of showing that the existence of MRSs is not self-evident at all.<BR/><BR/>Side note: I take it that you are also suggesting that my anti-introspection argument is far too basic to really work as an argument; you're right. I'll work it out more soon, hopefully. But one comment now: I'm not sure that speaking of introspection's "proper sphere" as you do still makes that much sense at this point, when externalism and pragmatics have firmly undermined the notion of introspection as a kind of inner perception. Richard Moran's "Authority and Estrangement" is a brilliant guide to all that stuff--partly in pointing out that what we need to explain is not how self-knowledge or introspection can be infallible (which is dubious), but rather why it is taken as authoritative.<BR/><BR/>2. The second part is to distinguish the theory of action-explanation from the theory of what action is really like. Part of this strategy involves suggesting that MRSs function within theories of action-explanation, but aren't as good for dealing with actions as they really are.<BR/><BR/>The second part is not meant to follow from the first, though you're right that I didn't make this clear enough. That is, I am not arguing, first, that there are no MRSs, and then insisting that we need an action-theory that doesn't involve MRSs. Rather, I am arguing that there is no obvious reason to accept the existence of MRSs, and an appeal to ignorance works for this purpose (e.g., we don't know that p, therefore we can't assume that p and get justified beliefs out of that assumption).<BR/><BR/>That there are no MRSs--or at least that action-theory shouldn't rely on their existence--requires independent arguments. I'll try to put up a brief post on this in the next few days.Roman Altshulerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06570099479055051251noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4639421058590597640.post-63087740630623787052008-01-13T08:19:00.000-08:002008-01-13T08:19:00.000-08:00I enjoyed reading this, as I did the first post in...I enjoyed reading this, as I did the first post in the series. Nevertheless, let me raise a worry about your line of argument.<BR/><BR/>So (in your view) Searle presents an argument for believing that there are MRS's; let's call this the Argument from Introspection. Your basic counter-argument is to discount such evidence, by noting that introspection has limits, and is fallible even within its proper sphere. But this counter-argument seems to veer dangerously close to an appeal to ignorance, i.e., an argument of the form:<BR/><BR/><I>We don't know that p.</I><BR/><I>Therefore, not-p.</I><BR/><BR/>('p' may be replaced with "There are MRS's.)<BR/><BR/>To put it in a more positive light, your counter-argument does seem to undermine the Argument from Introspection, but it doesn't seem to establish the non-existence of MRSs. If one were to claim that it did, that would be a fallacious appeal to ignorance. The counter-argument could legitimately only establish that, for all we know, MRSs may or may not exist.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com