tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4639421058590597640.post8640401551407381756..comments2023-04-13T02:45:50.515-07:00Comments on The Ends of Thought: Kant's Moral Psychology (II): Consciously Choosing PrinciplesRoman Altshulerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06570099479055051251noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4639421058590597640.post-81612955596143024852008-04-02T12:53:00.000-07:002008-04-02T12:53:00.000-07:00Just to be precise, I don't think Haack would say ...Just to be precise, I don't think Haack would say that reason reduces to psychology as her own view -- that's just how she seems to interpret Kant. (Or something like that -- she uses the lable "strong psychologism.")<BR/><BR/>Glad you like my practically non-existent blog. Funny story-- I made some posts to it, but I haven't been able to view or see the blog for a long time, and I assume it's the same for the rest of the worl.dMichael Younghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14834928837774294668noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4639421058590597640.post-84427974221374755892008-04-02T12:32:00.000-07:002008-04-02T12:32:00.000-07:00Thanks for this comment. I suspect Haack is under ...Thanks for this comment. I suspect Haack is under the same problem as many philosophers, who end up reading Kant while keeping a Humean notion of reason in mind, that is, a notion that simply rejects the idea of "reason" as a faculty that guides, and is irreducible to our particular processes of reasoning.<BR/><BR/>The second trend you mention--of conflating logical and moral necessity--is also a widespread and problematic one. It has the advantage of trying to make Kant more acceptable to contemporary audiences, but it should be used as a heuristic device, not as interpretation. If logical and moral necessity were the same, then immorality would involve nothing more than committing a reasoning error, which Kant firmly denies.<BR/><BR/>PS. I like your blog.Roman Altshulerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06570099479055051251noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4639421058590597640.post-16899357754120653652008-04-02T10:27:00.000-07:002008-04-02T10:27:00.000-07:00I think your approach to Kant is exactly correct. ...I think your approach to Kant is exactly correct. I would only add that this mistake of reading Kant empirically / psychologically extends past Kant's moral philosophy. E.g., Susan Haack has taken a strong pscyhological reading of Kant's theory of logic. This essentially amounts to the view that Kant, in saying that logic was "necessary," meant to be describing an empirical reality. In arguing against this supposed view of Kant in Philosophy of Logics, Susan Haack actually says something to the effect that 'surely we do reason illogically sometimes' -- as if this would have been news to Kant! Now Susan Haack is generally a terrific philosopher, so what this shows is how the wrong reading of Kant can make even good philosophers say silly things.<BR/><BR/>Part of the original problem here could be the failure to distinguish between different senses of the word "must" or "necessary." There is an empirical/predictive sense -- "if I drop this rock, it must fall"; a normative sense -- "one must keep one's promisees"; and a logical sense -- "the concept of x necessarily entails the concept y." And then!- the logical and normative sense tend to get conflated in Kant, perhaps because, for Kant, "oughts" derive from logical-conceptual analysis.<BR/><BR/>Maybe that helps, maybe not. Anyway, I appreciate your approach.Michael Younghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14834928837774294668noreply@blogger.com